In the last ten years, cloud services provided many applications in various areas. Most of them are hosted in a heterogeneous distributed large-scale cloud computing environment and face inherent uncertainty, unreliability, and malicious attacks that trouble both service users and providers. To solve the problems of malicious attacks (including solo and collusion deception ones) in a public cloud computing environment, we for the first time propose a double-blind anonymous evaluation-based trust model. Based on it, cloud service providers and users are anonymously matched according to user requirements. It can be used to effectively handle some malicious attacks that intend to distort trust evaluations. Providers may secretly hide gain-sharing information into service results and send the results to users to ask for higher trust evaluations than their deserved ones. This project proposes to adopt checking nodes to help detect such behavior. It then conducts gain-loss analysis for providers who intend to perform provider-user collusion deception. The proposed trust model can be used to effectively help one recognize collusion deception behavior and allow policy-makers to set suitable loss to punish malicious providers. Consequently, provider-initiated collusion deception behavior can be greatly discouraged in public cloud computing systems. Simulation results show that the proposed method outperform two updated methods, i.e., one based on fail-stop signature and another based on fuzzy mathematics in terms of malicious node detection ratio and speed.